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Adjustment  without growth has been, for many developing
countries,  the outcome  of the debt  crises  of the 1980s. Macro-
economic  stability, policy credibility,  and adequate external
financing  are among  the key  ingredients  for achieving  a strong
;i-vestment  response  to adjustment  measures.
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This paper - a product of the Macrocconomic Adjustment and Growth Division, Country Economics
Department - is part of a larger effort in PRE to investigate the response of private investment to
macroeconomic adjustment measures. Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. P;ease contact Emily Khine, room NI 1-061, extension 39361 (63 p3ges).
Serven and Solimano analyze the response of  tent or suspected to be only temporary - in
private and public investment to extemal shocks,  which case investors prefer to wait and see
macroeconomic adjustment, and structural  before committing resources to irreversible fixed
reform in three sets of countries:  (1) countries  investments.
that pursued structural reform and liberalization
in Latin America in the 1970s (Chile) or the  *  The sequence of adjustment measures is
1980s (Mexico and Bolivia); (2) countrit  that  thus important. Trade liberalization measures
experienced severe macroeconomic instability  undertaken while macroeconomic instability
and did not pursue macroeconomic reform  persists are likely to be viewed as purely transi-
(Argentina and Brazil); and (3) East Asian  tory, and thus might actually distort the invest-
countries with high-growth, outward-oriented,  ment pattem.
state-active economies that adjusted to the
shocks of the 1980s and maintained high growth,  *  Even well-designed, consistent adjustment
low inflation, and remarkable macroeconomic  programs might have to overcome a lack of
stability (Korea, Singapore, and Thailand).  credibility, especially in their early stages.  If
enough external resources are available, the
Drawing on the literature and their econo-  private sector may be more confident about the
metric analysis of the determinants of private  viability of adjustment efforts, which could
investment in developing countries using cross-  facilitate investment recovery.
country data for 1972-87, Serven and Solimano
conclude (among other things) that:  *  Even if policy changes are perceived as
permanent, inadequate infrastructure may pose a
* Macroeconomic stability and policy cred-  significant obstacle to the recovery of private
ibility are essential for achieving a strong  investment. The implementation of well-
investment response.  Investment is likely to be  targeted public investments in infrastructure
limited under great macroeconomic uncertainty  projects can stimulate the private sector's
or if policy measures are perceived as inconsis-  response to adjustment measures.
i  Thc PRE Working Paper Series disseminates thc findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Rescarch, and Extemal
Affairs Complcx. An objective of the serics is to ge these findings out quickly, cven ifpresentations  are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in thcsc papers do not necessarily represcnt official Bank policy.
Produced by the PRE Dissemination CentcrAdjustment Policies and Investment Performance in LDCs:






1.  Introduction  1
2.  Investment in Developing Countries, 1970-88  3
2.1  The overall picture  3
2.2  Private investment and macroeconomic adjustment:  7
some country stories
3.  Macroeconomic Policies and Private Investment:  Theory  29
and Emp;rical Evidence
3.1  Demand management policies and investment  29
3.2  Exchange rate policy and private investment  33
3.3  Trade liberalization and investment  38
4.  The Incentive Structure and Investment Response:  40
Credibility, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility
4.1  Irreversibility,  uncertainty, and investment  41
4.2  The role of credibility  44
5.  Econometric Analysis  48
6.  Conclusions and Policy Implications  54
References  59
*  We  thank  Jaime  de Melo  for  kindly  providing  his data  base  on
investment.  We are indebted to Max Corden for helpful conversations and
to Dani Rodrik for detailed comments and suggestions.  Bela Balassa and
Felipe Larrain  also contributed with comments  to an ea.iier version.
Walter Novaes provided able research assistance.1.  Introduction
Adjustment  wlthout  growth  has  ben,  for  many developing  countries,  the
outcome  of the  debt crisis  of the  eighties. The  adaptation  to the reduced
availability  of external  financing  has  not led  to a signifLcant  increase  in
domeotic  savings,  but  to a reduction  in  private  and  public  investment  rates.
WLthout  a  sufflelnt  recovery  of investment,  a sustained  resumption  of growth
is  unlikely.  In  such  conditLons,  the  attempts  at  structural  reform  of many
countrles  may be  endangered,  an in  the  absence  of an Lnvestment  response  their
intended  efficiency  gains  cannot  materialies,  and  thus  the  only  visible  result
of the reforms  is  their  adverse  short-run  social  and  distributivo  cost.
The decline  in  external  financing  is  not  the only factor  behind  the
invostment  slowdown.  In  many  cases,  the fiscal  adjustment  required  to  reduce
the external  imbalance  or to bring  down inflation  has  taken  the form  of a
reduction  in public  investment. Also,  the increased  macroeconomic  instability
associated  with the  external  shocks  of the eighties  has  made  the economic
environment  more uncortain,  and  hence  more adverse,  for  investment  decisions.
One Important  source  of uncertainty  has  been the  external  debt overhang,
especially  in  highly  indebted  countries,  which  may  also have  contributed  to
discourage  investment  through  its  implicit  tax'  effect,  as part  of the future
returns  on lnvestment  must be collected  by the  creditors  in the form  of debt
repayment.
In goneral,  the  macroeconomic  adjustment  and  reform  efforts  of most
countries  have  not been  rewarded  with an adequato  response  of private
lnvestment. Yven  when substantLal  progress  has  boen  made in  the  correction  of
macroeconomic  imbalances  and  in the  restoration  of profitability  --  oftenthrough  drastic  ck  e.  in  real  wages  --  the impact  on private  investment  has
bcen very  weak and  slow
In  this  paper  we investigate  the  contrlbution  of  these factors  to
explaininq  the recert  Investment  performance  In  developing  countries. The
paper is  organized  as follows. First,  in  Section  2  we present  the empirical
record  of investment  in  LDCa in  the 1970m  and  '980a. The  response  of private
and  public  Investment  to external  shocks,  macroeconomic  adjustment  and
structural  reform  is analyzed  by comparing  three  sets  if  countries. The first
group includes  countries  that  have  pursued  structural  reform  and
liberalization  in  Latin  Amerlca  either  in  the 1970.  (Chile)  or in  the 1980a
(Mexico,  Bolivia). The  second  group is  composed  by Argentina  and  Brazil,  that
in  the 1980s  have  experlenced  severe  macroeconomic  instabllitv. Moreover,
these  countries  have  not  attemptod  the  kind  of structural  reforms  pursued  by
the first  group.  The  third  group  consists  of three 'success  stories,  in  East
Asia:  Korea,  Singapore  and  Thailand. These  high-growth,  outward  oriented,
state-active  economies  were able  to adjust  to the  adverse  external  shocks  of
the 1980.  while  keeping  a record  of high  growth,  low  inflation  and, in
general,  a remarkable  degree  of macroeconomic  stabillty. In  Section  3  we
discuss  the llterature  on macroeconomic  policies  and  prlvate  investment,
examining  the  effect  of monetary,  fiscal  and  exchange  rate  policy  on private
investment,  and emphasizing  some  economic  and institutional  features  specific
to LDC  (e.g.,  the degree  of intervention  in financial  markets,  the posslble
complementarities  between  public  and  private  Lnvestment,  the  high reliance  on
imported  capital  goods)  that  may affect  the  transmission  mechanisms  through
which  standard  macropolicy  measures  lnfluence  private  investment. In  the-3  -
fourth  section  we examine  in  more  depth  the  recent  literature  on credibility,
uncertainty  and  Irreversibility  in Investment  decislons. We discuss  how  such
factors  can  contribute  to determine  the Investment  response  to a glven  set  of
economlc  Incentives,  which is  the  key  lemone  in the  transltion  from
stabilization  and  reform  to sustalnable  growth. In  Section  5  we present  an
econometric  analysis  of the  dotermlnants  of prlvate  investment  in developing
countrlie  usLng  croa-country data for  the  period  1972-1987  for  a selected
group  of LDCs.  Finally,  Section  6  presents  some  concluding  remarks.
2.  Investment  in Develovina  Countries,  1970-1988
2.1 - The  overall  picture
Between  1970  and 1988,  investment  rates  in  developing  countrles  exhibit
two  dlstlnct  patterns,  with  1982  the  point  of demarcation  (figure  1).  lor
seventy-eight  developing  countries,  the  average  share  of  investment  In GDP (in
constant  prices)  increased  from  about  22  percent  In  1970  to  25  percent  In
1981,  and  for  most  of this period  investment  rates  were historically  high.
With  the rise in International  real  interest  rates  In 1981  and  the  onset  of
the  debt  crisis  in 1982,  the rate  of Investment  fell  sharply. Investment
started  to fall  earlier  for  the  hlghly  Indebted  countries  than for  other
developing  countries,  and  the declLne  was also  larger  (see  table  1).  For  all
groups  of developing  countries,  the  decline  In Investment  was accompanled  by a
slowdown  in growth  (tables  1 and  2).
The fall in investment  has  been so  severe  that some  countries  may not
even  be  fully  replacing  depreciating  capital. For  example,  in  Africa  the
minimum  investment  neoded  to replace  depreciated  capital  is  estlmated  at 13- 4  -
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Rmoue  balanIce  deicit  AU  6.4  tU.3  6.2  4.6
(peNst  of COP  Hklhy  indebted  2  2.9  .1.7  .1.S
at crnwt  pricm)  Middlo irtcoue  72  11.1  6.7  4.0
Low inmote  72  12.7  .9  7.3
Crow dotatmc Lnvustmnt  AL  23.4  2t  20.6  19.6
(p.renutag of CDP  Hihly  0debted  21.1  U3  17.1  16.8
Alt  cotitAntpficls)  Middle  incomi  25.7  28.6  24.9  2U1
Low income  21.5  207  17.6  16.0
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Table  2  Growth  and  investment
Ral  OP  VrovJ  Invstment rato
1965-88  1980-88  1965-88  1980-88
Sub-Saharan  Africa  3.3  05  17.6  15.9
Asia  6.3  7.4  27.7  31.1
Europe/Middle East/
N. Africa  4.6  2.8  28.4  27.3
Latn  America
and  Caribbean  4.5  1.6  19.7  17.9
Source: Short-gm  Owitlook, Tternational  Monetary  Fund,  1989,
Table  15.percent  of GDP, and sevdn  countries  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  had investment  rates
below  that level  In 1987.  Similarly,  the  minlmum  investment  rate to replace
capital  in  Latin  America  is estimated  at 14  percent,  and  three  countries  were
below  that level  in 1987.1
Investmont  declined  both because  of the  reduced  availability  of  financing
and lower  domand  for  investment. There  were important  changes  in  the resource
balance  deficit  (dofined  as the  dLfforence  betwoon  domestic  investment  and
domestic  savings)  following  the  debt  crisis  in 1982 (table  1).  The decline  in
the  resourco  balance  deficit  (becauso  of lower  extornal  financing)  was  not
matchod  by a sufficient  increase  in  domestic  savLngs,  and so  the  deficit  was
almost  entirely  reflected  in reduced  investment. Investment  demand  declined
for several  reasons. Puklic  investment  contracted  because  of the
deterioration  in  fiscal  conditions  as a result  of the  cut Jn foreign  lending
and  the lack  of adjustment  In  other  fiscal  expenditures,  the rise in
international  and  domestic  interest  rates,  and  accelerating  inflationi  and
also  because  in some  cases  it was  unsustainably  high  and  of dubious
productivity. Private  investment  was  discouraged  by the slower  or negative
growth  and  by the increase  in macroeconomic  instability  associated  with  the
adverse  external  shocks,  the  uncertainty  about  the  now  cortiguration  of
relative  prices  and incentives,  and  the inability  of governments  to stabilize
the  economy.  In  additlon,  the  debt  overhang  may have  discouraged  investment
both  through  the  uncertainty  it  created  and  through  its  Implied  4tax"  on
1W. Easterly, "Fiscal  Adjustment  and Deficit  Financing  during the Debt
Crisis,'  in Dealing  with the Debt Critss,*  edited  by I. Husain  and I. Divan.
(Washington,  D. C.s  the  World  Bank,  1989).- 7  -
future  output  ard  the  accompanying  credit  rationing  in International  capltal
markets.
Analysis  of a set  of twenty-nine  countries  shows  that  the share  of
private  investment  in  GDP (in  current  prices)  was  ralatively  stable  until  1980
and  then  declined,  followed  by a  modest  recovery  after  1985  (figures  2 and
3).2  The  decline  was larger  in the  highly  lndebted  centries than Ln  the
other  countrles. Public  lnvestment  as  a share  of GDP and  of total  lnvestment
rose  until 1980  and  thon foll  after  1982,  two  years  later  than  prlvate
investment  (table  3).  Unlike  private  lnvestment,  public  investment  rates
declined  steadlly  untll  1988.
2.2  Private  Investment  and  MacrooconomLc  Adiuetment:  $ome  Country  Storles
in this s*ctlon  we organlzo  the  dlicussion  of the  behavLor  of private
investment  during  the  course  of adjustment  azound  three  groups  of countries  in
Latin  Amorican  and  Ln Sast  Asla.  Tho first  group  le  composed  by Chlle,  Mexico
and  Bolivia.  These  three  share  the  adoption  of docisLve  stabilization
polLcies  orlented  to eliminate  basLc  macroeconomlc  lmbalances  together  wlth
policies  of structural  reform  orlented  to liberalLze  foreLgn  trade,  and  to
derogulate  crodit  and labor  markets  along  free-market  lines. The second  qroup
we consider  li constitutod  by ArgentLna  aV.  Brazil,  two  countries  that in tho
1980e  have  been  unable  to stabilize  the  economy  and  correct,  ln a sustainable
2The breakdown  if investment  into  private  and public  components  draws  on
G. Pfeffermann  and A. Madarassy, 'Trends ln PrLvate Investment in Thlrty
Developlng  Countrie3,"  IPC  Working  Paper  No. 6, 1989.  They  calculated  private
investment  by subtracting  from  the  national  accounts  data  the  investment  of the
consolidated  public  sector. The  latter  was  obtained  from  World  Bank  reports  and
government  sources.- 8  -
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Table  *3 Public  and private  Investment  for a
group  of 29 developing  countries, 1970-88
(percentage  of GDP at current  prices)
CGoup  1970-80  1981-82  19834  198548
29 countries
Tota  20.3  22.2  18.8  17.6
Private  12.2  11.7  9.7  9.6
Public  8.2  10.5  9.0  8.0
13 highly indebted countues
Total  20.1  20.2  15.1  15.2
Private  12.3  10.9  8.1  8.7
Pblic  7.8  9.2  7.0  6.5
ampl.:  AzgendNza,  Bargladesh,  Bouvia', Bazil,  Chile', Colombia',
Cost  Rica', Ecutador, Cuatemals,  Huzswy, India,  Ind  onesa,
Kenya,  Korea,  Mulaysla,  Ma.dco",  Nigera', Patan,  Paul,
P.dIppnes', Portugal. Si  uLanka,  Thailand,  Tursa, Turkey,
YUNgUaY,  Vez~ua1',  Za  . Zbabwe.
* Hghly  Indebted  Cowets .a
Source:  "Adjustment  Lending  Policies  for  Sustainable  Growth,"
Policy  and  Research  Series  #14,  The  World  Bank.- 10  -
way, baslc  macroeconomic  imbalances,  and  that  have  not  attempted  comprehenalve
structural  reforms  and liberalization  of the  type  adopted  by the  countries  in
the flrst  group. The  thire  ;roup  consists  of three  success  stories  in East
Asla  and includes  Korea,  Singapore  and  Thailand,  namely  economies  that  have
managed  to sort  out  the  external  shocks  and  the  debt  crisis  of the  elghties
without  sacrlficing  high  growth  and  domestic  macrooconomic  stabillty.
Adjusting  cum  Liberallzing  Countries  in  Latin  Americas  Chile,  Mexico  and
ollvia
This  group  of three  Latin  American  countries  share  several  coimon
features  regarding  macroeconomic  policies  and  structural  reforms. At the
level  of macroeconomic  policy,  they implemented  either  in  the seventies
(Chile)  or In the  middle  and late  eighties  (Bolivia  and  Mexico)  restrictivo
fiscal  and  monetary  policies  oriented  to reduce  high inflation  rates  and
unsustainable  current  account  deficitse  The  three  of them  used fiscal
adjustment  (with  better  results  in  terms  of permanent  deficit  correction  in
Chile  and  Mexico)  as a centerpiece  of the stabilization  effort. The
comprehensive  use  of incomes  policies  for  stabilization  purposes  was  present
just  in the  Mexican  "Pacto  de Solidaridad  Zcon6mica"  of late  1987  though  in
the cases  of Chile  and Bolivia  some  form  of exchange  rate stabilization  and/or
3Bolivia's  inflation  between  1984-85  was a  case of hyperinflation  rather
than  high-chronic  inflation.- 11  -
wage controls  were  used  to help  dislnflatlon  at  difforent  time.  during  the
course  of stabillzation. 4
On the front  of structural  reforms  the  three  countrles  implomented  (to  a
dlfferent  extent)  trade  liberalization,  financial  deregulation,  privatizatlon
and labor  market  flexibilization.  The  degree,  timing  and  results  of these
policy  reforms  variod  in each  country,  though  there  was a general  free-market
orientation  in  the  throe  cases. Some  of tho policies  such  as trade
liberalization  and labor  market  flexibilization  (coupled  with  wage  controls)
were used as anti-Inflationary  devices  in additlon  to their  intended  nature  of
long  run  transformations  required  to improve  economic ffliciency  and  speed-up
economic  growth. 5 A common  feature  of the  reforms  --  particularly  in  Chile
and  Mexico--is  that they  were implemented  by strong  governments  whose
roputatlon  in avoiding  pollcy  reversals  was at stake. 6
Following  the  swings  of the  world  economy  ln  the 1980's  those  three
countrles  suffered  the  cycle  of over-borrowlng,  the sharp  cutoff  of foreign
lending  and  the  onset  of the  debt crisis. In  Chile  the  bulk of the  external
debt  was originally  contractod  by the  private  sector,  while  in  Mexico  and
Bolivia  the  public  sector  was  the actor  that  borrowed  abroad  most heavlly.
4For  a reference  on  the  Chilean  experience  with  stabillzation  ln  the  last
two  decades  see  Corbo  and  Solimano  (1990).  The  Bolivia  story  with  stabilization
and  reform  is  told  in  Morales  (1990).  For  a  comparative  analysis  of  stabilization
experiences  in  Latin  America  and  in  other  regions,  see  Solimano,  (1990).
5Rodrik  (1990)  calls  attention,  however,  to  the  weak  links  between  trade
liberalization  and  growth  both  at  an  analytLcal  and  empLrical  level.
6 The  crisis  of  1982-83  put  under  heavy  stress  some  of  these  policies  in
Chile.  Some  reversals  took  place,  such  as increases  in tariffs  and direct
intervention  of  the  financial  system.  However,  as  the  crisis  receded,  tari"s
were  lowered  again  and  the  financial  system  gradually  deregulated.- 12 -
Given this background, what have been the salient featureo in tho
behavior of private and public investment ln theme three economies? As table
4 shows, total Lnvestment ln the period 1985-88 declined by 4 to S points of
GDP with respect to the pro-crials perlod 1976-81.  Public investment declined
by almost 5 points of GDP both in Mexico and 8olivla over the saoe  period.  In
contrast, in Chilo the lovel of public investment in 1985-88 was hLgher than
before the debt crisis.  Private investment rates are still below their pro-
crisis level both in Bolivia and Chile, though the data shows a  recovery ln
private lnvestment ln Chile and Mexico towards the late 1980s.  In Bolivia,
however, no upsurge of prlvate investment has taken place in the aftermath of
stabilization.
what accounts for this performance of investment?  What is the role
played by the foreign debt crilss that hit these throe countries ln the
behavior of investment?  Was a decline in investment the toll pald for
correcting the macro dilequillbria in those economies?  What difference do the
structural reforms and a  more stable macro environment make for a quicker
response of private Lnvestment?
These are certainly difficult questions, though some hypotheses may be
advanced.  rirst, it is clear that the pattern of investment followed the
"debt cyclo."  Public Lnvestment in Mexico and prLvate investment in Chile
increased sharply during the borrowing-led boom of the late seventies and
early eightles.  in 1982, when the access  to extornal lending was abruptly cut
off and the countries were forced to a rapid reduction in the current account
deficit through tight demand policies along wlth real devaluation, investment
fell sharply.  Thus the adjustment was carried out basically through cutting- 13 -
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Investment  demand  ratner  than  by  increasing  domestic  savlngs,  a  trend  already
detected  In the  pre.Lous  sectlon.
The response  of private  lnvestment  ln  the aftermath  of  the crisis  of
1982-83  diffored  ln the  three  countrles  under  scrutlny. Private  lnvestment
recovered in  Chile  and  Mexico  in  the second  half  of the 1980e,  a  rather
puzzllng  phenomenon  Ln the  case  of Mexlco,  slnce  there  lt  took  place ln  splto
of very hlgh  real lnterest  rates.  In addltlon,  the recovery  of private
investment  occurs  when both  countrLes  carry-out  an important  resource  transfer
abroad. 7 In contrast,  in  Bolivla  the  response  of private  investment  ln  the
aftermath  of stabilization  has  boon  much  weaker  than in  Chlle  and  MexLco. A
fragLle  macroeconomic  equLlLbr!um  (Lnternalized  by the private  sector)  and
high  real Lnterest  rates  seem  to be the  chlef factors  behind  the slow  recovery
of private  lnvestment  Lr BolivLa. Morales  (1990)  explains  the  hlgh  real
lnterest  rate ln Bolivia  in  the aftermath  of stabilization  by two factores  the
policy  of tight  money,  and  microeconomic  problems  In the  banking  and financial
sector. Risk factors  and  credibility  problems  on the permanence  and
consolidation  of the  reforms  also  may have  played  a role in  the  observed  high
real interest  rates.
What can  we concludo  on the effects  of the reforms  on the  performance  of
private  investment  in  these  economies? The experience  of these  countries  ln
tho 1980e  shows  clearly  that the  reforms  may enhance  private  investment  if
they are  accompanied  by a stable  macro  *nvironment. High real  interest  rates
(reflecting,  in part,  the existence  of underlying  macro imbalances)  and  other
7An  econometric  analysis  of the  behavior  of  private  investment  in  Chile  in
the 1980s appear in Solimano (1990b).  For a discussion  of  the recovery  of
private  investment  in  Mexico  in the  mid-late  1980s  see  Ortiz (1990).- 16 -
fundamental  imbalances,  tend to harm  private  investment.  Chile in  the second
half of the 1980.  is  a good  example  of  how fiscal  balance,  moderate  real
lntereet  rates  and  competitive  real  exchange  rates  provide  a good  framework
for  private  investment  to  respond  to  the incentives  generated  by  the
structural  reforms. 8 On  the  contrary,  in  the  case  of  Bolivla,  where
disinflation  le  consolldated  but  the fiscal  accounts  and  the financial  system
are  regarded  as in  rather  fragile  condition  (Morales,  1990),  expectations  of
policy  reversal  have  a  depressing  effect  on  private  investment 9
A second  factor  that is important  for  the structural  reforms  to  be
associated  with a  positive  response  of prlvate  investment  is  the adequate
availabLlity  of external  financing. In  the  three  cases  there  is a  debt
overhang  and  the  countries  carry  out a sizeable  resource  transfer  abroad.
From simple  savings-investment  idontities  we can  conclude  that  without  a
corresponding  increase  in  domestic  savings  a  high level  of  investment  can
hardly  be achieved.  In addition,  the foreign  debt service  acts like  an
Implicit  tax  on investment.
A third  factor,  generally  down-played  in  the academic  literature  but  to
which investors  in  the  real  world  seem  to pay a lot  of attention,  refers  to
8The  development  plans  of the  late  sixties  in  forestry  and  agro-industrial
activities,  and the  new  land-property  structure  following  the agrarian  reform
are also elements  behind  the strong  export  response  of agricultural  goods in
Chile  in the  mid to late  1980s.
9Rogarding  a supportive  macroeconomic  environment  for  private  investment.
the  MHxican  case is in  between  Chile and  Bolivia. The fiscal  reform  has been
by far more comprehensive  in  Mexico than in Bolivia.  However,  real interes
rates in  Mexico  have remained  much higher  than in  Chile.-17 
tho favorable "business  cllmate" generated with the liberalization process
In fact, privatization measures as well as other liberalizing policies adopted
in these countries refloct a renewed faith in free  markets and  private
initiative.  The distinctive featuro is that governments now perceive these
principles as the "new engine to growthO.
Two non-adiustina casOs in Latin Americas Argentina and Brazil
Brazil and Argentina stand in the Latin Amrican  landscape of the 1980z
as two countries that have not been able to stabiliLz thelr economies, in
particular to abate a stubborn process of hlgh inflation that in some episodes
(e.g., Argontina in 1989) slild into outright hyperinflation.  Brazil managed
to grow at an Lpressive  7% per year between 1940 to 1980, and her developymnt
strategy was that of a diriglste state supported, in the sixties and
seventLes, by forelgn dlrect lnvestment and abundant external credits.
Brazils  external borrowing in the seventies largely went to finance her
ambitious  development  plans  that  required  high  investment  rates  to  speed-up
rapid  growth.  In  contrast,  since the early seventies Argentlna started to
experience  a noticeable economic declino, reflected in a slowdown of growth
and in mounting economic and political instabilLty.  Toward the end of the
1970e and in the context of an Lll-conceived exchange rate-based stabilization
10fsynes  (1936),  ch.12,  referred  to  lt  as 'the  state  of  confidence,  is  a
matter  to  which  practical  men  always  pay  the  closest  and  most  anxious  attention.
But  economists  have  not  analyzed  it  carefully... - 18  -
plan,  foreign  borrowlng  was  (basLcally)  used  to  flnance  the  acquisltlon  of
forelgn  assets  by  nationals  e.g.,  capltal  flilght. 11
The  adverse  external  shocks  of the  early  eightloe  and  the  onset  of the
debt  crlels  severely  hlt  Argentlna  and  Brazil. The  correctlon  of the  external
and  flscal  lzbalances  took  the  form  of  an acceleratlon  of  inflation  and  a
slowdown  ln  growth.  In  contrast  wlth  Mexlco  and  Bolivla  (Chle-  undertook  lts
structural  reforms  in  the mLd-1970.),  domestlc  authorltles  ln  Argentlna  and
Brazil  dld  not  seize  the  opportunlty  of the  crlele  to  attempt  comprehonslve
structural  reforms  ln  the  publlc  sector,  the  trade  regime  or  other  areas. The
bulk  of the  energles  of  the  domestlc  governments  ln  these  countrles  were
devoted  to  flght  lnflatlon  and  to  the  management  of thelr  large  external
debt. 12 Argentlna  was the  ploneer  wlth  hetorodox  stabillzatlon  wlth  the
launchlng  of the Austral  Plan  ln  mid 1985,  followed  by  Brazil  wlth  the  Cruzado
in early  1986.  After  lnltlal  success  those  plans  were followed  by  a
resumptlon  of lnflatlon  and  the  repeated  use  of prlce  controls  and  emergency
fiscal  measures  to  curb  (transLtorLly)  escalatlng  lnflatlon.  Examples  were
the  Bressor  Pereira  and  Summer  Plans  ln  Brazll  ln  1987-88  and  the  Primavera
Plan  and  other  partial  attempts  ln  Argentlna.  The  eltuatlon  worsened  ln  1989
for  both  economles  as the lnflatlon  rate  approached  hyperinflatlonary  levels
ln  a  context  of domestlc  recesslon  and  polltical  dlearray.
It is  certainly  not  surprlilng  to  flnd  a  poor  investment  record  ln  the
1980.  ln  countrles  like  Argentlna  and  BrazlI  affected  by  large  economic
llSee  C.A Rodriguez  (1989)  for  an analysis  of  the  foreign  debt  problem  in
Argentina.
12See  Heyman  (1990),  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1990),  and  Cardoso  (1990)  on  these
tvo  experiences  vith  stabilization.- 19  -
Instabllity. However,  there  are  some  differencee  between  these  two
experiences. Ae table  5 Illustrates,  the  drop In investment  rates  is far
larger  in  Argentina  than in Brazil. In fact,  In  Argentina  totai  investment  in
the  period  1985-88  Is  nearly  9  points  ot GDP lower  than in the  period  1978-81;
this drop In  total investment  Is  decomposed  in a reduction  of private
Investment  by S percentage  points  of GDP and  a  cut .'n  public  investment  by 4
percentage  points  of GDP.  Moreover,  this decline  in Investment  has  continued
(on  average)  In the  second  half  of the 1980s,  in  contrast  to other  Latin
American  countrLes. In  Brazil  the  drop in  total  lnveetment  Is less  sorlous
than In  Argentina  (its  share  in  GDP is 3 points  lower  in the  period  1985-88
than In 1978-8) and  private  investment  started  to recover  after  1984  though
public  investment  is stlll  below Its  pre-crLsis  level.
Argentina  provides  an almost  text-book  (though  dramatic)  case  where
protracted  economic  instablllty  is a  powerful  deterrent  to private  Investment.
An figure  S shows,  the  downward  trend  in  private  investment  --  as well as In
public  investment  --  sta:  ed  in Argentina  already  In the  mld-seventioe.
Clearly,  the preference  for  investlng  resources  abroad  rather  than at home  war
at  work before  the  debt crisls,  and  to a  large  extent  is  responsible  for  the
absence  of recovery  afterwards. On top  of that lack  of private  invoestment,
the  data shows  a public  investment  decline  in  the  1980e,  a phenomenon  tied  to
the fiscal  crisis  that  Argentina  suffer.  13
131t is  already  a  well  known  story  that  the  quality  of  public  services  has
deteriorated  sharply  in  Argentina  in  recent  years.  No  doubt  that  this  is  related
to the inability  of the  state  to improve  the  collection  of fiscal  revenues  from
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TABLE  5
PuILIC  AMC  PRIVATI  IMVIUIV  INT  AMG  AC0IMCSiIC  IWICATMS
ANNIUAL AVIRUAGs(l)  AIGMyTlWA
................................................  .........................................................  ..........
vARIABLIE  197341  ,  962-S  1  -U
,.....................................................................
TOTAL  ItVItSTMiT  22.03  16.30  13.08
(2  OF GOP)
PLELIC  IMVESTYNET  t0.1l  6.40  6.SO
(2  OF  owP)
PRIVATE IMVISTMEMT  11."5  7.90  4.56
(2  of  GOP)
REAL GOP CROTI4  -0.29  -C.04  0.20
(2)
:iFLATION  126.81  396.55  319.60
(GOP  OEFLATOR)
CURRENT  ACC  EALANCE  *3.32  *3.70  -3.01
(% OF MOP)
fCOREIGN  Oit  45.41  70.01  49.?
CT.  OF GOP)
REAL EXC)4.  RATE  124.13  209.91  239.78
('980  a  100)
.............................................................. I.......
SOURCES:  Inv*stfnMt:  Pf.tfernam,  O.P.  NW N  rasay,  A.  (1969)
Other  variOt  l  fr=  Worltd BWr 0etsse
PUSLIC  AMO  PRIVATE i1IVISTMENT ANO  PAC*ICONMIC  INOICATORS
ANNUAL  AVINAUGAI(S)  BW  IL
.....................................................................
VARIABLE  1978-61  1912-14  9-IMI
TOTAL  INVESTMENT  23.10  ¶3.40  20.43
(2  OF GOP)
PUBLIC  1IiVESTMENT  6.90  4.93  6.J
(2  OF GOP)
PRIVATE INVESTNEMT  14.20  11.17  13.73
(2  OF GOP)
REAL  GOP  GROWTH  3.4  0.79  4.11
(2)
[OIFLATION  72.97  154.05  317.19
(GOP  OFfLATOR)
CURRENT  ACC  BAIANCE  -4.49  -3.0  -0.63
(2  Of  GOP)
FOREIGN  OUST  23.47  43.51  9.72
(2  OF GOP)
REAL  EXCH.  RATE  67.19  6.05  101.91
(1950  . 100)
.....................................................................
SOURCUS:  Ircnv  An:  t:  PfgffefWV  ,  0..  P  V  disday, A.  (,0199)
Othier  vBiebL"  from  W.rtd  Bw* 0stalmo- 22 -
In the  came  of Brazil  the same  downward  trend  in  public  invostmont,
starting  in  the  early  eighties,  is  observed. Such  reduction  in  public
investment  has  been (part  of)  the fiscal  response  to  the reduced  external
financlng  as well  am to  the  enlarged  burden  posed  by the internal  public  debt.
Macroeconomic  Stabillty  in East  Asias  Korea,  Singapore,  Thalland
Let  us leave  Latin  America  and  take  a  look  at  some  of the  "success
stories"  in  East  Asia.  Let us consider  the  cases  of  Korea,  Singapore  and
Thailand. These  are  high  growth  *conomios,  outward  oriented,  with  active
state  intervention  in  economic  affairs  and, in  contrast  with  several  Latin
American  experiencae,  with  a  remarkable  degree  of macroeconomic  stability.
Korea  since  the  mid-sixties  has  been a  high  growth  country,  strongly
oriented  toward  the  expansion  of manufacturing  exports.  Income  distribution
is  relatively  egalitarianl 4, though  at the  political  level  the  country  has
boen  governed  slnce  the  sixties  until  1987  by  authorltarian  military  regimes.
Hlgh investment  rates  were  guided  by  a series  of five-year  economic
plans  where  the  government  intervened  actively  controlling  (among  other
things)  the  allocation  of  credit  to  firms  with an  overwhelming  focus  on
exports.  The  close link  between  government  and  business,  ln turn,  crevced
large  conglomerateo  and  a high  degree  of industrial  concentration. 15 The
trade  regim  has  been  far  from  liberal  in  Korea,  with both  tariffs  and
quantitative  restrictions  in  place,  although  in  the  eighties  a  relaxation  of
1 4The  agrarian  reform  is  credited  as  an  important  explanation  behind  the
relatively  even  income  distribution  in  Korea,  see  Collins  and  Park  (1989).
15 See  Collins  and Park (1989)  for  a good  description  of  the  Korean  case.- 23 -
theso  barriora  has  taken  placo. Exchange  rate  policy  has  boen  oriented  to
malnt,An  tho  oxtornal  competitivoness  of Koroan  exports,  though  some  episodoe
of real  appreciation  have  takan  place  (e.g.,  In  tho late  1970s). Korea  was
hit  by the  debt crisis  In  the  period  1979-82  but  rocovered  quickly  afterwards.
In contrast  with most  highly  indebted  countrier6, Korea  has  boon  able  to
reduce  her  current  account  deficits  after  1982  while  restoring  high  growth,
malntaining  low  inflation  and  avoldlng  fiscal  imbalances.
The  caso  of Singaporo  in  rather  particular. It is  a city-state,  with a
high  growth  economy,  completely  open  to foreign  trade  and  with (almost)
unrestricted  capital  mobility  operating  under  a  fixed  exchange  rate regime.
Per  capita  income  is  comparable  to that  of low  income  OECD countries  and  the
distribution  of Income  is considered  to be relatively  even.  Singapore  did  not
suffer  a  dobt crimes  in the  eighties  and  has  boon running  current  account
surpluses  since  the  mid 1980a  in the  context  of high  growth  and  very low
Inilation.
Thailand  borrowed  in the  late  seventies  and  adjusted  gradually  afterwards
taking  advantage  of a  good record  of creditworthiness  . In  the  eighties,  the
reduction  in  the  current  account  deficit  took  place in  a  macro  envlronment  of
sustalned  growth,  while  maintaining  inflation  low  and  the fiscal  budget  in
check.  This is  certainly  a case  of sorting  out adverse  foreign  shocks  without
going  through  a  macroeconomic  criaLs  and  domestic  instability.
16 Chile  is perhaps  an exception  in this respect.
17 See  Corden  (1990).- 24  -
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What about  Investment  in these  economies? Two  main features  are  worth
noting. Firt,  particularly  Korea  and  Singapore  are high-investmont-high-
growth  economies. In the  period  1978-88,  Korea  sustained n average  a rate  of
investment  near 30%  of GDP and  grow  at an annual  average  rate  of 6.5  percent.
Slngaporo  invested,  on average,around  40  per  cent  of GDP over  the same  period
and  grew  at an  averago  annual  rate  of 7.5  percent. Invostment  was not immune
to the  cycles  of economic  activity  experienced  in  these economies  in  the
elghties,  and some  volatility  in investment  is  shown  in  the  data.  To make a
judgement  of tho relatlve  efficioncy  of capital  in  these  countries  would
require  some  difficult  international  comparisons,  though  the Implicit  ICORIs
do not look  particularly  low.
Second,  the  data shows  that in  these  countries  private  investment  is  by
far  more Important  than  public  invostment  as a  share  of total  investment. In
Korea  around  three-fourths  of total  capital  accumulation  is  privatel  in
Singapore  and  Thailand  the  share  of private  investment  in  total  capital
formation  Is  around  two-thirds. Those  provide  intereating  cases  of strong
prlvate  sectors  backed  by active,  growth-oriented  governments.
An Overall  Assessment
From  the  diversity  of experiences  examined  before  some  conclusions
follow.
There  are  som  clear  differences  in  the levol  and  composition  of
investment  between  the Latin  American  and  Bast  Asian  countries
examined. During  the 19890  (and  also  earlier)  investment  rates  of
the  order  of 30%  of GDP and  more (40  percent  on average  in- 27 -
Singapore)  were not  unusual  in  the  East  Asian  countries. The  growth
record  was  also  remarkable  for  the 1980s,  with annual  average  rates
of growth  of the order  of 6.5  - 7.5  percent.  In  terms  of
compoition, private  investment  li  overwhelmingly  dominant,
representing  between  2/3  and 3/4  of total  capital  accumulation. In
Latin  America,  historically,  investment  rates  have  been  of the  order
18 of 20-25%  to support  rates  of growth  of GDP of 5.5-6.0%  per  year
In  the 1980e  averago  annual  GDP  growth  decoleratod  sharply  to around
1.5%  and investment  rates  centered  in the  range  of 15-18%  of GDP.
In  goneral,  the share  of public  investment  in capital  accumulation
is higher  in Latin  America.
*  The  analysis  suggests  that a  high  degree  of macroeconomic  stability
--low  and  predictable  inflation,  external  and internal  balance  --  is
of paramount  importance  to ensure  a  strong  response  of private
investment  to economic  incentives. The  last  Asian  cases  examined
provide  a  good  example  of this.  In  contrast,  in  some  Latin  American
countries  we  find  evidence  that  macroeconomic  instability  may be
largely  responsible  for  the  poor performance  of private  investment.
*  The  evidence  on the  effects  of structural  reforms  --  e.g.,
liberalization,  --  on private  investment  is,  so far,  still  sketchy.
Chile  experienced  a rapid  recovery  of private  investment  in  the lato
1980o  as  real interest  rates  receded  to "normal levels,  the  roil
18The average  annual  rate  of GDP  growth  for  the  period  1950-80,  was 5.8 Z
vith output  measured  in  adjusted  purchasing  power  terms.  GDP per  capita  in the
same  period  grew at an annual  rate  of 3 Z.  These  calculations  correspond  to  an
average  of 19  Latin  American  countries,  see  Cardoso  and Fishlow,  1989.- 26 -
exchange  rate  was  kept  at  highly competitive levels,  the  economy was
free of major micro distortlons  and  aggregate  demand was  hlgh
followLng a boom ln copper prlces.  MexLco --  whlch adopted far
reachLng reforms ln the areas of trade  liberalLsatLon,  fLical  reform
and privatization ln the eLghtLes --  also saw a revLval of prlvate
investment ln *plte of still hLgh domestLc  real  Lnterest rates.
BolLvia, however, that also llberalLi-d trade, deregulated credit
and labor markets and eliminated an hyperinflation ln the mLd-1980s,
has not wltnessed an upsurge of prLvato Lnvestment.
*  A  delilne ln public lnverstment  has been observed ln several
(adjusting and non-adjustLng) Latin Amorlcan  economioe  durLng in
the 1980s.  Chll- li one exceptlon ln this regard, though publie
investmnt  also declined sharply in the seventies when the
structural reforms were adopted.  This suggests that public
investment may be squeezed ln the process of balancLng the fiscal
and external accounts.  SimLlarly, hlgh domestic real lnterest ratoe
along wlth a hlgh level of public debt eventually impose  fLscal
tLghtenLng, whlch also tends to crowd-out publlc lnvestment both in
adjustLng and non-adjusting countrles.- 29 -
3.  Macroocon&Lc PolLeLs and Private  Investment:  Theory  and  emiirical
*vLdemnce"
In this sectlon  revLew  the literature  on  the  offeets  of  macroeconomic
polLcLeo  on  private  Lnvestment,  that  can  be  useful  to  understand  some of  the
experiences  discussed  before. In  particular  we  are  concerned  wLth  the  impact
on  Lnvestment  of  different  tools  of  monetary,  fLscal  and  exchange  rate  polLcy
aimd  at  correcting  unsustaLnable  macroeconomic  lmbalances.
3.1.  Demand  Mana_ment  PolLcles  and  Snvestment
(L)  Monetary  Policy  and  Private  Investment
The  restrictive  monetary  ar'  credit  polLcLes  usually  Lncluded  ln
stabilization  packages  affect  investment  through  two  *price channels. One  is
the  riLs  ln the  real  cost  of  bank  credit,  a  major  sourceo of  Lnvestment
financing  ln LDCs.  The second  is  the  Lncrease  Ln  the  opportunity  cost  of
retaLned  earnLngs  --  also an important  source  of Lntvetment  financing  ln  most
developLng  countrles  --  due  to higher  real interest  rates. Both  mechanisms
raise  the  user cost  of capital  and lead  to a  deciLne  of investment.  The
empirical  rolevance  of this effect  has  been  confirm_d  ln  a  number  of  studLes
(e.g.,  do Melo and  Tybout  (1990),  Greene  and  Villanueva  (1990),  Solliano
(1990)),  but others  do not find  a significant  effect  of Lnterest  rates  on
Lnvestment  demand. The  reason  li  that ln  the  repreod  financial  markets  that
characterls many LDCo,  credit  policy  affects  invesotnt diroectly,  through  the
stock  of credit  avaLlable  to firma  with  access  to preforentLal  Lnterest  rates,
rather  than through  the Lndirect  Lntereot  rate  channel  --  although  the latter
19ThLi section  draws,  partly,  from  Serven  and Soliano (1990).- 30 -
will also  operate  for  the  firms  that  borrow  in  the  unofficial  money  market
(see  Van  Wljnbergen  (1983a  and 1983b)). This  direct  role  of  credit
availability  is found  in  many *mplrical  studies  (e.g.,  van  Wijnb.rgen  (1982),
Blejer  and Kahn (1984),  Llm (1987),  Dallami  (1990)). Hence,  the institutional
set-up  of the  financial  markets  in developing  countries  is  certainly  an
important  feature  determining  the impact  and  t. numission  mechanisms  of
monotary  and  credit  policy  on investment.
(ii)  fiscal  Policy,  Public  Investment  and Private  Investment
Hlgh fiscal  deflcits  push  up interest  rates  and/or  reduce  the
availability  of credit  to the  private  sector,  and  thus  tend  to crowd  out
private  investment. Hence,  the  reduction  of the public  deficit  usually
achieved  in adjustment  packages  should  allow  an expansion  of private
investment. However,  as  the experiences  of several  Latin  American  countries
in the  SOs  show,  fiscal  adjustment  often  takes  the  form  of  reduced  public
lnvestment,  some  of whose  components  (especially  infrastructure  investments
such  as roads  or coaiuunicatLons)  may  be complementary  with  private  investment.
As  a  result,  private  investment  would  fall  as  well.  From  the  policy
viewpoint,  this  would  underscore  the need  to protect  public  infrastructure
expenditures  during  the adjustment  process,  in order  to facllitate  the
recovery  of investment  and  growth.
Several  empirical  studies  have attempted  to shed  light  on this issue.
The results  obtained  by Blejer  and  Kahn (1984)  from  cross-country  data
indlcate  that public  investment  In infrastructure  is  complementary  with
private  investment  (and  other  types  of public  investment  are not). More- 31 -
recently,  Greene  and  Villanueva  (1990)  have  arrlved  at similar  conclusions
using  a panel  of 23  developing  countries. Musalem  (1989)  flnds  evidence  of
complementarity  between  private  and  public  investment  in a tLme-series  study
of Investment  in  Mexico. However,  lalamma  (1988)  reports  cross-section
estimates  showing  that  public  and  prlvate  investment  are  negatively  related,
with an Increase  in public  lnvestment  leadlng  to a decllne  ln  private
lnvestment. Furthermore  he flnds  a negative  correlation  between  the  share  of
publLc  lnvestment  in total  lnvestment  and  the size  of incremental  output-
capital  ratios,  whlch lndlcates  a  lower  efflciency of publlc  lnvestment  as
opposed  to private  lnvestment. Khan  and  Reinhart  (1990)  reexamlne  the  issue
of the dlfferentials  ln  productlvlty  between  private  and  publlc  lnvestment  for
a sample  of 24 developlng  countries,  findlng  that  the  marglnal  productlvlty  of
publlc sector  capltal  ls negative,  although  not  slgnlficantly  no,  whlle  that
of private  lnvestment  is  slgnlflcantly  positlve.
The maln  drawback  of most  of these  emplrlcal  studles  Li thelr  fallure  to
conslder  lnfrastructure  lnvestment  separately  from  other  types  of publlc
investment. Whlle ln  most  cases  thli  may be  due to the  unavallablilty  of
lnformation,  such  dlsaggregatlon  would  help  identify  more  preclsely  the
relationship  between  public  and  private  investment.
(iii) Outout  changes  and  Investment
Emplrlcal  studles  of lnvestment  behavlor  show  a strong  response  of
lnvestment  to changes  ln  output.  Investment  ln LDCr  is no exception  to this
rule,  and  most econometrlc  studles  conclude  that  output  fluctuations  are  the
most important  determlnant  of prlvate  lnvestment  (see  e.g.,  Blejer  and  Kahn- 32  -
(1984),  faini  and  de melo (1990),  Greens  and  Villanueva  (1990)). To a certain
extent,  this in  a puzzling  flnding,  since  a non-negllgLble  part  of output
fluctuatlons  ap.iSr  to be transitory  (therefore  they  should  not  affect
Lnvestment),  and lt is costly  to Lnutall  capltal  (so  adjusting  to tranmitory
shocks  is  also  costly). Thus,  this  excessive,  output-related  varLability  of
Lnvestment  in the  cycle  remalns  largely  unexplalned  (see  Blanchard's
discussion  of Shaplro,  (1986)).
Whatever  the  cause  for  this  excessLve  output  sonaLtivity  of lnvestment,
the  clear  implication  li that  the  usual  demand-reduclng  monetary  and fiscal
policies  lntroduced  as part  of an adjustment  package  are  likely  to have an
adverse  short-run  impact  on Lnvestment  through  their  negatlve  effect  on output
growth. ThLs  is apparent  ln  the context  of the  Q approach  to lnvestment:  as
the  econometric  evldence  shows (see  Solimano  1989,  for  the  case  of Chile)
aggregate  profltablilty  li hLghly  procyclical  --  TobLn's  Q lncreases  ln
upturns  and  falls  ln  downturns  --  so  we should  expect  the  market  value  of
capLtal,  and  hence  invostment,  to fall  ln the  short  run ln response  to a
slowdown  ln  economlc  actlvlty  followlng  restrLctlve  domand  pollcles.
This  lnltlal  downturn  ln  economlc  activlty  often  assocLated with
macroeconomlc  adjustment  may  also  affect  lnvestment  through  its  effect  on
expectations. In fact,  a current  recession  could  form  the  basis  for
"persimlitico  expectatlons,  that  lead  Lnvestors  to postpone  Lnvestment  until
the  recovery  arrLves;  this, ln  turn,  may prevent  the  take off  of lnvestment
(particularly  of projects  wlth short  gestatlon  lags)  and  delay  the recovery
ltself,  and  the  economy  may get stuck  ln  a  low  Lnvestment  equilbrlum  because
%of  LnsuffLcient  lnvestment  arlsing  from  self-fulfilling  preslmlim. How  to- 33 -
avoid  such  an  outcome  is an Important  consideration  in  the design  of
restrictlve  demand  polLcles  that  mLnimLse  the  potentially  adverse  impact  on
Lnveutment  and  growth.
3.2.  Exchange  rate  policy  and  PrLvate  investment
To reduce  the  external  imbalance,  adjustment  progrms use  a  combination
of expendLture-reducing  and  expendlture  switching  policLes. The latter
typLcally  include  a real  devaluatLon;  thus ln the  80s  many LDCs  undertook
sharp  real  depreclatlons  as part  of the adjustment  to the  debt crLiLs. A real
deprecLatlon  affects  investment  through  several  channels:
1i)  The profitabliLty  of investment  - Investment  goods  can  be viewed  as
a  composite  commodlty  produced  by combining  domtic  (i.e.,  construction  or
Lnfrastructure)  and  forelgn  components  (i.e.,  machinery  and  equlpment). In
this setting,  a real  depreclation  of the  exchange  rate  raises  the real  cost  of
the Imported  component  and  acts  llke  an adverse  supply  shock  ln  the
"production"  of investment  goods  --  wlth  the  magnitude  of the shock  being
glven  by the import  content  of investment.  As argued  by Buffie  (1986)  and
Branson  (1986),  the  effect  of a real  devaluation  then li  to ralse  the  real
cost of new  capital  goods Ln  terms  of domestic  goods;  ceterls  paribus,  this
effect  tends  to depress  Lnvestment  in  the nontradable  actlvltles. However,  in
the  traded  goods  sector  the  opposlto  happenst  the  real  cost of new  capltal
goods  falls,  and Lnvestment  rlsoe. The result  for  aggregate  investment  is
therefore  uncertaLn.
Despite  thli theoretlcal  amblqulty,  most  emplrlcal  studies  conclude  that
ln  the short  run a  real  depreciation  has  an adverse  Lmpact  on Lnvestment- 34 -
through this cost-of-capital-goods effect  (although lts long-run effect may
be positlve).  For example, Musalem (1989) finds an adverse Investment effect
of devaluation ln the case of Mexico.  Falnl and de Molo (1990) arrlve at
iLmllar  reoults usLng data for  24 developlng countries.  Branson (1986)
explicitly calculates the lmpact of a devaluation on Tobnins Q in the home
goods sector, concludlng that proflts fall (and along wlth them the market
value of capital) whlle the real cost of new capltal goods rlers followlng a
real deprecLatlon.  Uslng an emplrlcal simultaneous equation modol for Chleo
based on an extended Tobin's Q approach, SolLmano (1989)  also concludes that a
real deproclatlon reducoe lnvestment ln the short run.  His results show that
economy-wlde Q falls when the real exchange rate dcpreclates, an the adverse
replacement cost effect domlnates tho market value effect.
In general, a hlgh dependence on lmported capltal and intermedlate goods
and a relatively low share of the traded goods sector Ln total investment
would make the contractlonary result hold.  ThL  is  made expliclt by Lizondo
and MontLel  (1988), who distinguish betwoon Lnvestment Ln the traded and non-
traded goods sectors  Ln a model in whlch capital is  s*ctor-speclflc.  They
decompose the effect of devaluatLon on profitabillty lnto three elements: a)
the Lmpact on the cost of capital;  b) the effect on the product wage ln both
sectors  (also examlned by Van Wljnbergen  (1986)  and Rliager (1988)); and c)
the Lmpact on the cost of Lmported Lntermedlate inputs.  They show that the
not effect of a real depreclatLon Ls generally ambiguous, slnce  Lt tends to
Lncrease investment ln the traded goods sector and reduce lt Ln the hom  goods
sector.- 35  -
Another  channel  through  which  devaluatlon  may affect  the  profltab$lity  of
inveutment  is  the  real interest  rate.  Consider  first  the  came  of an
unantlcipated  devaluation  (we  discuss  below  the  antilcipated  devaluation  case),
and  assume that  interest  rates  are  determined  in  domestic  assets  markets
(I.e.,  in  the  money  market). Devaluation  raises  the  prlce  level  through  its
impact  on the cost  of imported  intermediate  Inputs  and  wagea  under  indexation;
if  monetary  pollcy  does not  fully  accommodate  the increase  in  the  price  level,
j._l  money  balances  fall,  pushing  up the  real Interest  rate for  a given  rats
of (exp3cted)  inflation. In this  way,  devaluation depresses  the  market  value
of existing  capital  and  exerts  an adverse  effect  on investment. On the  other
hand,  if devaluation  was anticipated  and  if it  succeeds  in ellminating
devaluation  expectations,  then it  ma. result  in  an investment  expansion,  since
the required  return  on capltal  would  tend to fall  reflecting  the  reduction  in
the anticipated  rate  of depreciation.  Whether  this  will be so depends  or the
degree  of capital  mobility  and  also  on the Import  content  of investment  (see
below).
(ii)  Devaluation,  activity  levels  and  investment: Devaluation  may also  affect
investment  through  its  impact  on aggregate  demand. ThLi  may  be especially
lmportant  when firms  face  sales  constraints,  so that  the  degree  of capacity
utilization  or other  variable  representing  demand  considerations  has a strong
systematic effect  on  investment  (as  noted  above,  such  effect  is  often  found
empirically).  If  devaluation  reduces  aggregate  demand  ex-ante,  then  ex-post
investment  is  likely  to fall.  Moreover,  if Lnvestment  has  a  sLgnificant
import  content,  then  output  expansion  is likely  to be a  necessary  (but  not- 36  -
sufficient)  condition  for  lnvestment  not  to fall  ex-post  (S-rven  (1990)).
The literature  on contractionary  devaluation  (Krugman  and  Taylor  (1978),
Van Wijnbergen  (1986),  Zdwards  (1987),  Solimano  (1986),  Lizondo  and  Montiel
(1989))  emphasizes  the  slow  working  of sabstitution  effects  arising  from
devaluation;  hence  in  the short  run  the  impact  of a real  devaluation  on
aggregate  demand  is  dominated  by its  advers income  effects.  The  latter
operate  through  two  main  channelas  one  arisoe  from  the  likely  Initial  trade
Imbalance,  which  results  in a real  incomo  transfer  to the  rest  of the  world
(even  at given  terms  of trade)t  tho  other,  from  the  negative  impact  on
consumption  of real income  redistribution  from  wages  to proflts. On tho
supply  side,  three  transmission  mechanisms  may  contribute  to output
contraction: the Increased  real  cost (Ln  torms  of domestic  goods)  of imported
inputs,  the  rise  of  working  capital  costs (due  to increased  interest  rates),
and  real  wage resistance. If  the  net  effect  of a currency  devaluation  is
contractionary,  i.e.,  GDP falls,  then  the slump  in  economic  activity  is likely
to form  the  basis  f-- investors  to cut  investment  spending  --  unless  they
clearly  perceive  the  slump  to be transitory. However,  with sufficiently
strong  substitution  effects  (e.g.,  a  large  impact  of devaluation  on net
exports)  an expansionary  outcome  wlll result,  and so  devaluation  may  raise
real  incom  and  stimulate  investment  spendLng  as  the  dogree  of  capacity
utilization  increases. This outcome  becomes  more likely  as time  passes  and
substitution  effects  gradually  come into  play (see  solimano,  1986,  for  an
evaluation  of such  J-curve  type  effects  of devaluation on output  in Chile).- 37 -
(iv) Anticipated  depreciation  and the  timing  of Investment  - The  discussion
until  now  has focussed  on the  effects  of devaluation  without  making  any
explicit  distinction  between  anticLpated  and  unantLeipated  devaluation. An
anticipated  devaluation  can also  have  a substantial  impact  on the  tiAing  of
investment. This results  from  the  combination  of two  opposing  effects  ot
devaluation  expectations:  the  effect  on interest  rates,  and  the  effect  on the
future  cost of capital  goods  imports  (for  a detailed  exposition,  se*  Sorven
(1990)).
The effect  of an anticipated  devaluation  on interest  rates  depends  on the
degreo  of capital  mobility  --  that  is,  on  the  costs  of portfolio  adjustmen$
In  the  general  caso  of lmperfect  capltal  mobility,  the  domestic  real  Interest
rate is an increasing  function  of the  forelgn  real  interest  rate  plus  the
expected  rate  of depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate (it  may also  depend  on
the relative  or absolute  stocks  of financlal  assets).  The  perception  by the
public  that  a real  depreciation  is imminent  will  be reflected  in hlgher  real
interest  rates  --  and  more so the largor  the  degree  of capltal  mobility. In
this  way, devaluation  expectations  represent  a transitory  investment
disincentive;  pending  the  depreciation,  the  real  interest  rate is high  and
investment  is low. once devaluation  has  taken  place,  the  transitory
investment  disincentive  is  eliminated  and  investment  rises.
The  import  content  of  capital  goods  operates  in  the  opposite  direction.
When a  real  depreciation  is  antLeipated,  the  real  cost  of  imported  capital
goods  is  expected  to risel  pending  tho  depreclation,  capital  goods  imports  are
transitorily  cheap  and  hence  investment  must  be  transltorily  high (the
mechanism  is  entirely  mimilar  to an anticipated  increase  in tarlffs  on- 38 -
investment goods).  As pointed out by Dornbusch (1986),  this represents a
transitory Investment incentive, that disappears once the dopreciation is
actually implemented.
Obviously, the not effect on investment depends on the dogroe of capital
mobility relativo to the import content of investment.  Wlth high capital
mobility, the interest rate effect dominates, and devaluation expectations
lead to an investment slump that will persist until the depreciation is
actually undertaken.  Wlth low capital mobility and high import content of
investment, an anticipated depreciation may roesult  in a transitory investment
boom, and the actual depreciation may give way to a drop in investment.  As
described in Serven (1990), these concluslons are consistent wlth the
empirical evidence for Chile and Uruguay.
3.3 - Trade liberalization and investment
Trade liberalization is one of the structural reforms that eften
accompany macroeconomic adjustment measures.  In principle, a permanent trade
liberalization should reduce investment In the previously protected import-
competing sector and encourage Investment in the export sector.  Hence, its
impact on aggregate investment is uncertain, as it depend. on the relative
capital intenolties of the different economic sectozs.20 In practice, in many
LDCr the protected sector is relatively capital-intensive, and thus trade
liberallzation could well result in roduced aggregate investment --  which of
20This  is empirically  confirmed by Lopez  (1990), who doos not  find any
significant effect of import and export restrictions on capital accumulation in
a sample of 35 developing countries.- 39 -
course  may be consistent  with enhanced  growth  due to the  increased  efficiency
with  which investment  would  be used.
However,  when liberalization  is perceived  as  temporary,  its  results  can
be very  different. In such  case,  the removal  of trade  barriers  can  introduce
important  distortions  in  both the  intertemporal  and  the  sectoral  allocation  of
investment. The timing  effect  is  similar  to the  one  examined  in the  previous
subsection:  if irvestment  goods  have a high import  content,  a temporary
liberalization  amounts  to a transitorily  low  cost  of investment  goods,  and
hence to a temporary  investment  incentive. This  may lead  to a transitory
investment  boom,  vyhich,  in addition,  is likely  to be allocated  to the 'wrong'
sectors:  if trade  restrictions  are  expected  to be reintroduced  shortly,  the
increased  investment  will be directed  to the  protected  sector  and  not to the
export  industry  --  exactly  the  opposite  effect  to  what the  liberalization
intended  to achieve.
Thus  a  trade  liberalization  suspected  to  be only temporary  can  have very
adverse  consequences  for  investment. As several  authors  have  emphasized  (see
van  Wijnbergen  (1985),  Rodrik  (1989)),  this is especially  so  when investment
is irreversible:  then  there  is an incentive  to  halt investment  in all sectors,
to avoid  the irreversible  mistake  of investing  in  what can turn  out  to be the
'wrong'  activity. We explore  the issue  of irreversibility  in  more depth  in
the  next section.- 40 -
4.  The incentive  structure  and investment  response: credibility,  uncertainty
and irreversibilLty
A key ingredient  of most  macroeconomic  adjustment  packages  is a change  in
economic  incentives  that  switches  spending  towards  domestic  goods (offsetting
the  deflationary  bias of the  usual  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint)  and raises
profitability  in the  tradable  sector. This change  in incentives  is expected
to lead  to an outburst  of investment  in  the  tradable  goods  sector,  Lncreasing
productive  capacity  and  enhancing  economic  growth  --  and  thus  ensurLng  the
sustainability  of the  adjustment  effort.
In practice,  however,  the investment  response  often  is  unexpectedly  weak,
and involves  long  delays  (a clear  example  is the  case of Bolivia  in the  late
80s).  This  poses  major  diffLculties  for  the  adjustment  effort,  since  in the
absence  of an investment  expansion  the  short-run  deflationary  consequences  of
the  expenditure-restraining  measures  may be magnified,  leading  to a persistent
reduction  in growth. In this  way, the  lack  of an adequate  investment  response
in the  tradable  sector  to the  change  in  economic  incentives  increases  the  cost
of the  adjustment  ln terms  of employment  and growth;  ultimately,  it  may render
the  stabilization  effort  socially  unacceptable  and  thus  unsustainable.
Conventional  Lnvestment  theories  cannot  provide  a satisfactory
explanation  for  this slow  reaction  of investment. To justify  the latter,  one
would  have to assum  that firms  face rapidly  increasing  adjustment  costs  to
investment  --  whlch  does  not sees to  hold true  empLrically  --  or that
Lnvestors'  expectations  adapt  very slowly  to changes  ln the  economic
envlronment  --  but there  is  no clear  rationale  for such  suboptiml behavior  by
investors. A more satisfactory  explanation  can  be offered  by emphasizing  the
importance  of uncertainty  factors  in investment  decisions.- 41  -
4.1  Irreversibility,  Uncertainty,  and Investment
As an emerging  literature  has  emphasized  (see  Pindyck  (1989)  for
references),  the  key role  of uncertainty  in investment  decisions  follows
directly  from the  irreversible  nature  of  most investment  expenditures. These
can  be viewed  as sunk  costs,  because  capital,  once installed,  is firm-  or
industry-specific  and  cannot  be put to  productive  use in  a different  activity
(at  least  without  incurring  a substantial  cost).  The  decision  to undertake  an
irreversible  investment  in  an uncertain  environment  can  be viewed  as involving
the  exercising  of an option  --  the  option  to  wait for  new information  that
might  affect  the  desirability  or timing  of the investment. Thus,  the  lost
value  of this  option  must  be considered  as part  of the  opportunity  cost of
investment  --  an issue  which is  overlooked  in  the  conventional  net  present
value  calculations  (which  would  therefore  underestimate  the  opportunity  cost
and  overpredict  investment).  As recent  studies  have shown,  this  opportunity
cost  can  be substantial,  and is also  very  sensitive  to the  prevailing  degree
of uncertainty  about  the  economic  conditions  that  determine  the future  returns
to the investment.  As a consequence,  changes  in  uncertainty  can  have  a very
strong  impact  on aggregate  investment;  from  a  policy  perspective,  the
stability  and  predictability  of the incentive  structure  and the  macroeconomic
policy  environment  may  be as important  as the  level  of the taz  incentives  or
the interest  rate.  In other  words,  if  uncertainty  over the  economic
environment  is high,  tax  and  related  incentives  my  have to be very (or  even
prohibitively)  large  to  have any significant  impact  on investment.
It is important  to note  that  this  effect  of uncertainty  is completely
independent  of investors'  risk  preferences  or of the  extent  to  which  their- 42  -
risks  may be diversifiable. Investors  may be risk-neutral  (as  assumed  by most
of  the  irreversibility  literature)  and their  risks  completely  diversifiable;
yet investment  would continue  to depend  negatively  on the  perceived  degree  of
uncertainty. The latter  becomes  important  here simply  because  the  fixed
investment  decision  cannot  be 'undone'  (at  least  at zero  cost)  if future
events  turn  out to  be unfavorable. In general,  there  will be a value  to
waiting (i.e.,  an opportunity  cost  to investing  today  rather  than  waiting  for
information  to arrive)  whenever  the investment  is irreversible  and  its returns
evolve  stochastically  over time.
The relevance  of these  results  for  macroeconomic  policy,  especially  in
developing  countries,  cannot  be overemphasized.  Consider,  for  example,  the
problem  of relative  price  volatility.  Many developing  countries  suffer  from
high and  unpredictable  inflation,  which is  usually  matched  by high relative
price  variability. The  irreversibility  approach  suggests  that  this  would
reduce  the  effectiveness  of relative  price  changes  in stimulating  investment.
Specifically,  a history  of frequent  relative  price  swings  would  make investors
extremely  cautious  in reacting  to a policy-induced  change  in sectoral
incentives;  substantial  time  may elapse  before  investors  become  convinced  that
the  change  is permanent  --  and  before  they  are  willing  to  give  up their  option
to  postpone  investment. Notice  also  that the  implementation  of an adjustment
program  may  well increase  uncertainty  in the  short  run,  as private  agents
start  receiving  mlxed Lncentive  signals  --  some  associated  with the  previous
policy  rules,  aome  with the  stabilization  package,  and som  with the
structural  reforms  aimed  at restoring  modium  term  growth. An example  along
these  lines  is  provided  by  van  Wijnbergen  (1985),  who shows  that  a trade- 43 .
reform  which  is  suspected  to  be  only  temporary  can  in  fact  lead  to  a  fall  in
investment  --  as  economic  agents  postpone  investment  in  both  the  home  and
traded  goods  sectors  in  order  to  receive  additional  information.
The  debt  overhang  faced  by  many  high-indebted  countries  creates  a  similar
problem,  which  has  been  emphasized  by  Sachs  (1988).  It  &rises  from  the  need
to  carry  out  an  external  transfer  to  the  country's  creditors,  and  represents
another  source  of  LnstabliLty  of  the  macrooconomlc  envLronments  in  a  context
of  uncertainty,  the  level  of  the  real  exchange  rate  and/or  the  demand
management  policLes  consistent  with  the  required  transfer  also  become
uncertain:  the  size  of  the  transfer  itself  is  not  known  with  certainty,  as  it
depends  on  uncontrollable  factors  such  as  the  future  level  of  world  interest
rates  and  the  terms  of  trade.  Carrying  out  the  transfer  may  require  future
real  exchange  rate  changes,  fiscal  contraction,  or  both. Thus  investors  must
face  the  risk  of  large  swings  in  relative  prices,  taxation,  or  aggregate
demand;  as  we  argued  above,  each  of  them would  lead  to  reduced  investment.
In  practice,  this  effect  may  be  hard  to  identify,  since  foreign  debt  may
affect  investment  adversely  through  two  additional  channels  (emphasized  by
Borenzstein  (1989)).  First,  the  debt  overhang,  which  acts  as  an  anticipated
foreign  tax  on  current  and  future  income:  since  part  of  the  future  return  on
any  investaent  will  accrue  to  the  creditors  as  bigger  debt  service  payments,
it  discourages  capital  accumulation  and  promotes  capital  flight.  Second,  the
credit  rationing  effect:  a  highly  indebted  country  is  likely  to  face  credit
constraints  in  international  capital  markets,  which  is  equivalent  to  facing
higher  real  interest  rates,  and  this  will  also  discourage  Lnvestment.
Empirical  studies  have  confirmed  the  adverse  impact  on  investment  of  the. 44 -
foreign  debt  burden  (e.g.,  Faini  and  de  H lo  (1990),  Greene  and  Villanueva
(1990)),  though  still  more  research  is  needed  to  identify  the  specific
mechanisms  at  work.
4.2 The  role  of  credibility
From  a  policy  perspective,  a  very  important  source  of  uncertainty  is  the
imperfect  credibility  of  polLcy  reforms.  The  latter  is  related  to  the
public's  perceptions  about  both  the  internal  consistency  of  the  adjustment
program  and  the  government's  villingness  to  carry  out  the  program  despite  its
implied  social  costs.  Unless  investors  viev  the  adjustment  program  as  fully
credible  in  both  senses,  the  possibility  of  a future  policy  reversal  vwll
become  a  key  determinant  of  the  investment  response.  As  argued  by  Dornbusch
(1988),  Rodrik  (1990),  the  policy  measures  of  an  adjustment  program  can  easily
be  reversed  --  while  investors  cannot  undo  their  fixed  capital  decisions.  In
such  conditions,  the  value  of  waiting  arises  from  the  losses  (the
'irreversible  mistake',  in  Bernanke's  (1983)  terminology)  that  investors  would
incur  if  policy  were  in  fact  reversed  in  the  future.  Clearly,  the  larger  the
perceived  probability  of  a  future  policy  reversal,  the  less  willing  investors
will  be  to  undertake  fized  investment  projects  --  or  the  larger  the  current
return  they  vill  require  in  order  to  compensate  for  the  possibility  of  an
irreversible  mistake.  Moreover,  such  increase  in  the  required  return  on
investment  can  be  substantial  *ven  when  the  perceived  probability  of  reversal
is  moderately  low,  as  Dornbusch  (1989)  and  Rodrik  (1989)  have  shown.  Thus,
when  investment  is  irreversible  policy  uncertainty  can  have  disastrous- 45 -
consequences  for  private  investment  (Rodrik,  1990).21
This  also  implies  that  any  gLiven  set  of  policy  easures  can  have  widely
different  effects  on  investment  depending  on  the  prevailing  degree  of
'confidence'  of  the  public.  In  particular,  stabilization  may  entail  large
social  and  economic  costs  if  credibility  ie  low  --  sLnce  the  investment
response  will  be insufficLent  to  offset  the  deflationary  bias  of  the  usual
fiscal  and  monetary  restraint  masures:  thus,  a  persistent  receseLon  may
dtvelop  before  investors  become  confident  enough  that  the  adjustment  measures
will  be  maintained.  This  may  be  particularly  relevant  in  economies  with  a
past  history  of  frequent  policy  swings  or  failed  stabillzation  attempts  --  two
features  shared  by  many  highly  lndebted  countries  --  in  which  the  ptlvate
sector  has  learned  to  view  adjustment  programs  with  considerable  skepticism.
Hence  setting  the  right  economic  incentives  ls  a required  precondition
for  investment  and  growth,  but  it  does  not  guarantee  that  they  will  in  fact
take  place. Bolivia  and  Mexico  provide  examples  of  a rather  slow  lnvestment
response,  while  Korea  and  Singapore  are  cases  of  strong  private  sector
response  to  economic  incentives.  Obviously,  high  credibility  would  help  speed
up  the  investment  response  and  reduce  the  costs  of  the  adjustment.  However,
the  question  of  how  can  credibility  be  affected  by  government  actions  remains
largely  unresolved.  Specifically,  an  important  issue  here  is  the  choice
between  gradual  and  abrupt  stabilization.  The  former  would  set  initially
modest  objectives,  which  can  be  achieved  with  near  certainty,  in  order  to
build  up  the  government's  reputation.  The  latter  would  start  with  an
21Thia  adverse  impact  of  uncertainty  on  private  investment  in  LDCs  has  been
empirically  verified  ln  several  recent  studies  (see  Sollmano  (1989),  Faini  and
de  Melo  (1990),  Lopez  (1990).- 46 -
overadjust.ant  (e.g.,  an  over-depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate)  to  frontload
the  incentlves  to  resource  reallocation  (but  also  the  costs  of  the
adjustment).  As  argued  by  Edwards  (1988),  the  choice  may  largely  depend  on
the  specifics  of  each  countryl  the  social  distribution  of  adjustment  costs
implicLt  in  the  program,  together  with  past  policy  experience,  are  likely  to
be  important  lssues  here.
It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  policy  reversal  ic  an  endogenous  out-
come  in  this  framework,  since  current  private  sector  decisions  affect  the
opportunity  set  of  future  policy  actions  and  ultimately  determine  the
sustainability  of  the  adjustment  policy.  As  an  example,  consider  again  the
case  of  a large  real  depreciation  that  due  to  low  confidence  fails  to  attract
investment  to  the  tradable  sector.  Its  only  visible  effects  will  be  a
deflationary  real  income  cut  and  an  income  redistribution  from  labor  to
capital,  especially  in  the  traded  goods  sector;  however,  because  the
depreciation  is  not  sufficient  to  compensate  for  the  lack  of  credibility,  the
increased  profits  will  be  reflected  in  increased  capital  flight.  Social
pressure  and  balance  of  payments  problems  may  eventually  force  policy
reversal,  thus  confirming  the  initial  skepticism  of  investors.
The  alternative  situation  starts  with  high  confidence,  which  allows  an
investment  boom  and  validates  the  adjustment  program.  Thus,  there  are  two
possible  outcomes,  and  the  final  result  of  the  adjustment  measures  is- 47 ;
indeterminate 22. This  is  due  to  the  existence  of  an  externality  that  creates
a  wedge  between  the  social  and  private  returns  to  investment:  higher  aggregate
investment  helps  sustain  the  adjustment  effort  and  therefore  results  in  higher
returns  to  investment,  a  mechanism  that  will  be  ignored  by  the  individual
investor.  If  left  to  its  own  resources,  the  economy  may  get  stuck  in  the  'low
investment-adjustment  failure'  equilibrium 23. Since  the  'high  investment-
adjustment  success'  equilibrium  is  clearly  better  in  a  meaningful  sense,  it  is
crucial  to  investigate  what  specific  policy  measures  can  lead  the  economy  to
this  superior  outcome.
There  is  no  simple  answer  to  this  question.  While  transitory  investment
incentives  would  appear  as  the  most  appropriate  tool  to  address  the  investment
externality,  in  practice  they  run  the  risk  of  destabilizing  public  finances,
which  often  are  a  key  element  in  adjustment  programs.  On  the  other  hand,
sufficient  external  support  to  the  stabilization  effort  may  play  an  important
role  by  raising  investors'  confidence  in  the  sustainability  of  the  adjustment,
thus  giving  way  to  the  Livestment  takeoff.  In  fact,  the  lack  of  external
resources  has  been  a  negative  element  that  probably  contributed  to  weaken  the
private  sector's  confidence  in  some  stabilization  attempts  in  highly  indebted
countries.
220beerve  that in both cases  expectations  are self-fulfilling,  which
reflects  the  existence  of  multiple  rational  expectations  equilibria.  Such  result
is familiar  from  the  literature  on investment  under  monopolistic  competition
(Kiyotaki  (1988),  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1989)).  An eazmple  of indeterminacy
similar  to that in the text,  but focussed  on the consequences  of trade
liberalization,  is  provided  by  Rodrik  (1989).
23Hovever,  when  multiple  equilibria  are  present  there  is  no  clear  rule  to
determine  which  of  the  possible  outcomes  will  in  fact  prevail.  An  attempt  to  shed
some light  on this issue  is  made by Krugman  (1990).48 -
5.  Econometric  analysis
In  the  preceding  discussion  we have  examined  from  the  theoretical
viewpoint  the  effect  on  private  investment  of  a  number  of  factors.  The
inmmediate  question  is  to  what  extent  can  these  factors  contribute  to  explain
the  observed  performance  of  investment  in  LDCs  in  recent  years.
To  investigate  thl issue,  in  this  section  we  estimate  a  simple
investment  equation  using  pooled  cross  section-time  series  data  for  a  group  of
developing  countries.  We  postulate  that  real  private  investment  is  a  function
of  real  output  growth,  the  real  exchange  rate,  real  public  investment,  the
foreign  debt  burden,  and  the  degree  of  macroeconomic  uncertainty/instability:
IP/Y  - F(AY,  e,  IG/Y,  Di/Y,  o, (IP/Y)_ 1)
where  IP  is  real  private  investment,  Y is  real  output,  e is  the  real  exchange
rate,  IG  is  real  public  investment,  D-  /Y  is  the  foreign  debt/GDP  ratio,  and  a
represents  an  appropriate  measure  of  instability.  For  empirical  purposes,  we
also  introduce  lagged  private  investment  among  the  explanatory  variables,  in
order  to  allow  for  some  dynamics  arising  from  adjustment  and/or  installation
costs.  According  to  our  previous  discussion,  we  would  expect  real  output
growth  to  exert  a  positive  effect  on  the  private  investment  rate;  in  contrast,
an  increase  in  the  degree  of  economic  instability  or  in  the  burden  of  foreign
debt  should  reduce  investment.  On  the  ^ther  hand,  the  effect  of  the  real
exchange  rate  is  uncertain,  as  discussed  before;  the  same  applies  to  the
public  investment  rate,  which  can  have  an  expansionary  or  contractionary- 49 -
effect  on  private  investment  depending  on  whether  public  investment  is
,rimarily  complementary  with  or  substitutive  for  private  investment. 24
To  estimate  this  investment  equation,  we  use  data  for  the  years  1972-1987
for  twelve  developing  countrles  so  our  sample  is  constituted  by  192
observations.  The  choice  of  sample  period  was  dictated  by  data  availability;
the  countries  considered  are  essentially  those  whose  performance  was reviewed
in  section  2.2  above,  to  which  we  add  Colombia,  Kenya,  Turkey  and  Uruguay.
Thus  tho  total  sample  comprises  these  four  countries  plus  Argentina,  Bolivia,
Brazil,  Chile,  Korea,  Mexico,  Singapore  and  Thailand,  and,  as  we  noted  before,
represents  a  six  of  positive  and  negative  adjustment  exporiences.
To  masure  mncertainty  o,  we  followed  other  authors  ln  using  the  sample
variability  of  some  key  macroeconomic  variables.  In  particular,  we
experimented  with  the  variability  of  the  real  exchange  rate  and  of  real  output
growth;  the  corresponding  results  are  reported  below.
Because  for  each  country  the  uncertainty  variable  a  is  time-invariant,
the  investment  equation  was  estimated  using  a two-step  procedure.  First,  we
compute  the  estimates  of  the  coefficients  on  the  time-varying  variables  (i.e.,
all  explanatory  variables  except  a)  using  an  instrumental  variable  procedure.
In  the  second  stage,  we recover  the  coefficient  estimate  for  the  uncertainty
variable  e  (for  details  see  e.g.,  Anderson  and  Hsiao  (1982)).
24We should  note  that  our  empirical  equation  does  not include  the  real
interest  rate  among  the  explanatory  variables.  Our  experiments  with  alternative
measures  of the ex-ante  real  interest  rate  proved  unsuccessful.  The  usual
dlfficulties  in  measuring  such  variable  are  in  our  case  likely  to  be  compounded
by the  vLde  differences  in  flnancial  market  arrangements  across  the  countries
in the sample,  and  also  across  time  periods. Thus,  we opted  for  excluding
interest  rates  from  our  final  specification.- 5o  -
We experimented  with  different  dynamic  specifications,  allowing  for  lags
in  the  effects  of  the  explanatory  variables.  However,  the  results  were  in  all
cases  very  similar.  Table  7  presents  the  first-stage  estimation  results  for
the  preferred  specification,  which  was  selected  on  the  basis  of  the  overall
significance  of  the  estimates.- 51 -
Table  7
Determinants  of  Private  Investment  (;972-87)
(dependent  variable:  log(IP/Y)  )
Variable  Coefficient  T-statistic
Real  output  growtha  3.532  3.853***
Real  exchange  rateb  (lagged)  .002  .031
Public  investmentc  (lagged)  .058  1.170
Foreign  debt/GDP  ratiod  -. 104  -2.633***
Lagged  dependent  variable  .584  9.845***
R2  .584
SEE  .203
N.  obs  180
Notes:  a  - First  difference  of  the  log  of  real  GDP  (sources  World  Bank).
b - Log  of  the  real  exchange  rate  index  (source:  World  Bank  and  IFS).
Increase  means  depreciation.
c - Log  of  the  real  public  investment/real  GDP  ratio  (source:  World
Bank).
d  - Log  of  the  ratio  of  foreign  debt  to  GDP  in  U.S.  dollars  (source:
World  Bank).
- Coefficient  significant  at  the  5  percent  level.- 52  -
Table  8
The  Effect  of Uncertainty  on Private  Investment  (1972-87)
(dependent  variable:  country-specific  effect  from  Table  5.1 )a
Variable  Equation  1  Equation  2  Equation  3
Constant  -7.413***  -7.592***  -7.373***
(-50.566)  (-63.710)  (48.495)
Output  growth  variabilityb  -.130  -----  -.134***
(-1.)24)  (-1.986)
Real  exchange  rate  ----  -.011  -.013
variabilityb  (-.755)  (-.993)
Notest  a - T-statistics  in brackets
b - Heasired  by  the  coefficient  of variation.
- S3guificant  at the  S  percent  level- 53  -
As in  most empirical  studies,  we find  that  real  output  growth  has a
strong  positive  impact  on private  investment. In  contrast,  the  effect  of the
real  exchange  rate  is  very small  and insignificant,  even  after  allowing  for  a
one-year  lag;  this  is in accordance  with our theoretical  discussion  in  which
we identified  several  channels  through  which the  real  exchange  rate  affects
investment  in  opposite  directions.
Public  investment  has a positLve  effect  on private  investment  after  a
one-year  lag,  suggesting  that  complementarity  relationships  between  both
investment  categories  dominate  in  our sample. However,  the  effect  is only
moderately  (i.e.,  at the  25 percent  level)  significant.
As expected,  the  foreign  debt  burden  has a strong  negative  effect  on the
private  investment  ratio. As we discussed  above,  this result  may reflect  a
combination  of the increased  macroeconomic  uncertainty  arising  from  the  need
to carry  out an increased  resoirce  transfer,  or also from  credit  rationing
effects  in  world  capital  markets.
Finally,  we also find  substantial  inertia  in  private  investment,  as
indicated  by the large  and  highly  significant  coefficient  of the lagged
dependent  variable.
Using  the  resuits  in  Table  7,  we can  estimate  the  impact  of uncertainty
and instability  on the  private  investment  ratio. Our two  proposed  measures  of
instability  are  the  variability  of the  real  exchange  rate,  and  the  variability
of real  output  growth:  in  both cases,  variability  is  measured  by the
coefficient  of  variation  of the  corresponding  variable. The  empirical  results
for  three  alternative  specifications  (using  real  exchange  rate  variability,
output  variability,  or both,  as the relevant  uncertaLnty  measure)  appear  in- 54  -
Table  8.
Because  the sample  for  the sesond-stage  regression  is very small (only
12 observations),  the  results  should  be viewed  only  as suggestive.
Nevertheless,  as Table  8 shows,  we do find  that  in all  cases  the  uncertainty
measures  have  a negative  effect  on private  investment;  thus,  countries  with
higher  real  exchange  rate  instability  and/or  higher  growth  variability  tend  to
have lower  private  investment  ratios  --  although  only  the  output  variability
effect  is statistically  significant  at  conventional  levels.
6.  Conclusions  and Policy  Implications
One  of the  most troublesome  features  of the  experience  with
macroeconomic  adjustment  in LDCs in the  eighties  has been the  adverse  impact
on investment. In  most cases,  the adjustment  measures  have not been rewarded
by a  vigorous  response  of private  investment,  and  this  creates  the  risk  of a
persistent  growth  slump  and  an eventual  failure  of the  adjustment  effort.
The  cross-country  comparison  carried  out  between  several  Latin  America
and  East  Asia  countries  suggest  the  following  results  regarding  the
performance  of investment:
*  There  are some  clear  differences  in  the level  and  composition  of
investment  between  the  Latin  American  and  East  Asian  countries
examined. During  the  1980s  (and  also  earlier)  investment  rates  of
the  order  of 30Z  of GDP and  more (40  percent  on average  in
Singapore)  were not unusual  in  the  Bast  Asian countries  to support
growth  rates  of GDP of the  order  of 6.5 - 7.5  percent. In terms-5  -
of composition,  private  investment  is overwhelmingly  dominant,
representing  between  2/3  and  3/4  of total  capital  accumulation.
In  Latin  America,  in the  1980s  average  annual  GDP growth
dec lerated  sharply  to around  1.5Z  and investment  rates  centered
in the range  of 15-182  of GDP (historically,  in  Latin  America,
investment  rates  have  been  of the  order  of 20-25S  to sustain  rates
of growth  of GDP  of 5.5-6.0S  per anum). In addition,  on average,
the share  of public  investment  in  capital  accumulation  is  higher
in  Latin  America.
The  analysis  suggests  that  a high degree  of  macroeconomic
stability  --low  and  predictable  inflation,  external  and internal
balance  --  are  of paramount  importance  to ensure  a strong  response
of private  investment  to economic  incentives. The  East  Asian
cases  examined  provide  a good  example  of this  assertion. In
contrast,  in several  Latin  American  countries  macroeconomic
instability  may be largely  responsible  for  the  poor  performance  of
private  investment.
*  The evience on the  effects  of structural  reforms  --  e.g.,
liberallzation,  --  on private  investment  is,  so far,  still
sketchy. Chile  experienced  a rapid  recovery  of private  lnvestment
in the late  1980s  as real  interest  rates  receded  to  nor.al'
levels,  the real  exchange  rate  was kept  at highly  competitive
levels,  the  economy  was free  of  major  micro distortions  and- 56 -
aggregate  demand  was high following  a boom in  copper  prices.
Mexico  --  which  adopted  far  reaching  reforms  in  the  areas  of trade
liberalization,  fiscal  reform  and  privatization  in  the  eighties  --
also  saw a  revival  of  private  investment  in  spite  of  still  high
domestic  real  interest  rates.  Bolivia,  however,  that  also
liberalized  trade,  deregulated  credit  and  labor  markets  and
eliminated  an  hyperinflation  in  the  mid-1980s,  has  not  witnessed
an  upsurge  of  private  investment.
*  A deelLne  in  public  investment  has  been  observed  ln  several
(adjustlng  and  non-adjusting)  Latin  American  economies  during  in
the  19609.  Chile  is  one  exception  in  this  regard,  though  public
investment  also  deelined  sharply  in  the  seventies  when  the
structural  reforms  were  adopted.  This  suggests  that  public
invostment  may  be  squeezed  in  the  process  of  balancing  the  fiscal
and  external  accounts.  Similarly,  high  domestic  real  interest
rates  along  with  a  high  level  of  public  debt  eventually  lmpose
fiscal  tightening,  which  also  tends  to  crowd-out  public  investment
both  in  adjustLng  and  non-adjusting  countries.
On  the  other  hand,  we can  summarize  our  econometric  results  as  follows:
*  Real  output  growth  has  a  strong  positive  impact  on  private
lnvestsent.  In  contrast,  the  effect  of  the  real  exchange  rate  is
mll  and  statistically  LisnipLficant  in  our  sample, even  after
allowLng  for  a  one-year  lag.- 57 -
*  Public  investmert  has  a  positive  effect  on  private  investment
after  a  one-year  lag,  suggesting  that  complementarity
relationships  between  both  investment  categories  dominate  in  our
sample.  However,  the  affect  is  only  moderately  (i.e.,  at  the  25
percent  level)  sLgnificant.
*  The  foreign  debt  burden  has  a strong  negative  effect  on  the
prlvate  investment  ratio.  This  result  may  reflect  a  combination
of  the  increased  macroeconomic  uncertainty  arLsing  from  the  need
to  carry  out  an  increased  resource  transfer,  or  also  from  credit
rationing  effects  in  world  capital  markets.
*  Our  tvo  proposed  measures  of  instability  (the  variability  of  the
real  exchange  rate,  and  the  variability  of  real  output  growth,  in
both  cases,  measured  by  the  coefficient  of  variation)  have  a
negative  effect  on  private  investment;  thus,  countries  wLth  higher
real  exchange  rate  instability  and/or  higher  growth  variability
tend  to  have  lower  private  investment  ratios  --  although  only  the
output  varLabllity  effect  is  statistically  significant  at
comventLonal  levels.
What  can  we conclude  for  the  desLgn  of  growth-enhancing  adjustment
programs?  First,  macroeconomic  stability  and  policy  credibllity  are  key
ingredients  for  the  achievement  of  a strong  investment  response.  In  a  context- 58 -
of high  macroeconomic  uncertainty,  the reaction  of investment  to incentive
changes  is likely  to  be very limited. The same  will  happen  if the  policy
measures  are  perceived  as inconsistent  or suspected  to be only temporary. In
such  circumstances,  investors  will prefer  to  wait and  see  before  committing
resources  to irreversible  fixed  investment.
Second,  this  has important  implications  for  the  sequencing  of adjustment
measures. In particular,  macroeconomic  stability  is  a  prerequisite  for  the
success  of many types  of reforms. For  example,  trade  liberalization  measures
undertaken  in a context  of large  macroeconomic  imbalances  are likely  to be
viewed  as purely  transitory,  and  thus  can  have  very adverse  consequences  on
the intertemporal  and intersectoral  allocation  of investment.
Third,  even  vell-designed,  consistent  adjustment  programs  may  have to
overcome,  at least  in  the early  stages,  the  consequences  of lack  of
credibility. The  availability  of sufficient  exttrnal  resources  can play  an
important  role  here,  by raising  the  private  sector's  confidence  in the
viability  of the  adjustment  effort,  thus  contributing  to facilitate  the
recovery  of private  investment.
Fourth,  even if the  policy  changes  are  perceived  as permanent,  the lack
of adequate  infrastructure  may pose  a significant  obstacle  to the  recovery  of
private  investmnt.  The  implementation  of  well-targeted  public  investments  in
infrastructure  projects  that  complement  private  investment  can  play an
important  role  to stimulate  the  private  sector's  response  to the  adjustment
measures.- 59  -
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